Introduction
The development of contemporary biomedical research has led, inter alia, to a proliferation of regulatory regimes and protocols, in addition to major transformations in its knowledge-base and management (Clarke et al 2010) . The configuration of theories, technologies and techniques include complex systems of regulation. When biomedical research is developed specifically for application to human subjects for medical treatment, the regulatory imperatives become especially stringent. These regulatory regimes are not merely external or contextual features of biomedical work.
They are also integral to the work of the scientists and clinicians themselves. In essence, the work of the laboratory is geared not only towards the production of scientific knowledge, but also the demonstration that regulatory protocols have been adhered to (Lewis and Atkinson 2011, Stephens, Atkinson and Glasner 2011 i ).
We examine some key aspects of the dialectic between innovative bioscience and the regulatory frameworks in which it operates. Basing our discussion on two case-studies, we detail the tensions faced by scientists working to establish a particular level of laboratory sterility deemed suitable for handling cell therapies for clinical use. If the laboratories are successful, they would be recognised as meeting the requirements of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP): an essential criterion for using biological materials intended for clinical application. We use the two cases to introduce our analysis of regulatory regress. Regulatory regress reflects the potential 2 for uncertainty in scientists' attempts to achieve regulatory compliance, and regulators' uncertainty in recognising when such compliance has been attained.
Our two ethnographic case-studies are of laboratories dealing with human cellular material. The first ethnography, conducted by Stephens, is a three-year project exploring the UK Stem Cell Bank, which acts as a central storage hub and distribution centre for human embryonic stem cells (as the UK Stem Cell Bank is unique, we do not attempt to conceal its identity under a pseudonym, cf. Stacey and Stephens 2012) .
The second, conducted by Lewis, is a one-year study of a British research laboratory working with primary human foetal material as a potential treatment for Huntington's disease (hereafter referred to as Headlab). At the time of the relevant fieldwork, both the Bank and Headlab were seeking GMP accreditation for their laboratory space.
Although their scientific and technical tasks differed, the two organisations faced similar problems in managing regulatory regress.
We do not imply that these technical issues of implementation and interpretation of regulation are the only issues that face laboratory or Bank staff.
Clearly these actors conduct and conceptualise their work within much broader frameworks of values, ethics and regulations. We also do not claim that this account exhausts all the ethical issues that confront the scientists and other actors involved in these settings, nor exhaust all the practical work they put into strategies of compliance. We have published some of these broader issues elsewhere (Lewis and Atkinson 2011 ). Finally, we do not attempt to encompass all of the ethical and legal regulatory regimes that impinge on our research settings.
Rather, our purpose here is more confined and more analytically focussed: we concentrate on the specific issue of regulatory regress, and on actors' solutions.
Accreditation, GMP, and Human Cellular Material
GMP was first introduced in 1925 with the Therapeutics Substances Act to control for substances that could not be adequately examined by chemical means (Appelbe 2005) . Today many countries use GMP legislation to best ensure the safety of patients using new pharmaceutical products and medicines. Key components of GMP accreditation include: (a) performance of best-practice standard operating procedures when conducting research; (b) research staff being trained to a GMP standard; and (c) the building of an accredited GMP clean room where air pressure, temperature and sterility are monitored. This room has air-locked doors, pressure-recording gauges, and an ID-card system and those entering the room are required to wear appropriate full body 'Tyvek' suits (Stephens, Atkinson and Glasner 2008ii) . These 'contours of surveillance' (Lewis and Atkinson 2011) are put in place to attempt to minimise the risk of tissue contamination (Pfeffer 2009, Stephens, Atkinson and Glasner 2011 (Pfeffer & Kent 2007) .
Although GMP was a key issue for our research participants at the time of the research, and is a key example in our discussion, our analytic interest is not in GMP per se. Rather, we treat it as a case of a more generic analytic topic -that is, the phenomenon of regulatory regress. The local interpretation and application of regulatory imperatives makes closure possible through the application of practical solutions. The closure of potential regress is not, therefore, achieved solely through the iterative application of the regulations themselves, but through social processes and situated activities.
Regulatory Regress
Regulatory regress is an empirical generalisation that we have drawn from our ethnographic studies. We articulate it first as an analytic concept, before exemplifying it from our case-studies. The analysis is led by the observation that both laboratories are investing considerable labour in (a) interpreting regulatory texts, and (b)
identifying which regulatory texts were the relevant ones for interpretation.
Identifying the correct way to do this was a practical concern for both laboratories leading them to seek external clarification that their procedures were suitable. Our observations recall Wittgenstein's argument (Wittgenstein 1953 , Winch 1958 Consequently, actors engage in practical actions -often prolonged -that represent their understanding of regulatory requirements, and that comply with the regulatory frameworks to which they are accountable. These are, we stress, dependent on scientists' and regulators' practical interpretations of regulatory criteria.
Our usage reflects the concept of the 'experimenter's regress': the circularity that experimenters cannot tell if an experiment has worked until they know the 'correct' outcome, yet they cannot know the correct outcome until they have an experiment that works (Collins 1985) . Regulatory regress means that a regulatory actor does not know the correct interpretation of a regulation until the wider networks shaping its meaning are settled, yet these wider networks cannot be settled until a correct interpretation is agreed. Consequently, regulator and regulated are equally implicated in the cycle of uncertainty. This is why we do not use the term regulator's regress since the uncertainty affects both sides of the regulatory dyad. It is also this inherent cyclicality that identifies this as regress, a specific form of interpretative flexibility.
As with the experimenter's regress, regulatory regress does not remain open indefinitely. The continuous looping -that you need to know A before you can know B, but you need to know B before you can know A -is a logical paradox that challenges those conducting an experiment or instantiating regulatory practice.
Closure is achieved on a practical basis through ad hoc, unspoken acquiescence on the part of interested actors. To return to Wittgenstein, the rules for the interpretation of a 6 rule arise in the broader 'form of life' in which they are operationalised. The translation of explicit regulatory frameworks into practice is dependent on the tacit practices of the parties to the regulatory relationship. Echoing Collins (1975 Collins ( , 1985 on experimental method, and Pinch & Bijker (1984) on technological development, we demonstrate how social negotiation resolves interpretative flexibility. We also follow these authors in using an understanding of closure that recognises the contingency of the form closure takes and the potential for the closed to be reopened.
In the following sections we demonstrate that the UK Stem Cell Bank and
Headlab's experiences of trying to accredit their facilities as GMP-compliant exemplify the creative and local negotiation of regulatory regress. Laboratory staff seek an agreed interpretation of regulatory documents. They also engage with regulatory institutions to reach agreement as to which texts to interpret. The analysis of this process is illuminating in three important ways. First, it makes explicit the interpretative and procedural flexibility of regulatory scripts (Jordan & Lynch 1988) .
Such flexibility opens the possibility that further resources are required to develop an agreed interpretation. Second, it highlights the extent to which regulatory practice is not determined solely by the producers of regulatory documents but also by those who use, interpret and implement them (see also Rothstein et al. 1999; Oudshoorn & Pinch 2003 
Regulatory issues at the UK Stem Cell Bank
The grade' material, meaning hESCs derived and stored under GMP conditions.
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As a location of innovative bioscience the Bank has found itself occupying a space on, or beyond, the cutting-edge of UK bioscience regulation. Franklin (2001) and Waldby (2002) argue there has been a tension between the discourses around stem cell science and the existing regulatory boundaries between transplantation and reproduction. Stem cell science has not comfortably fitted with either of these categories; instead bridging them both, with neither regulatory mechanism able to fully accommodate the technology. As a consequence, the Bank, and laboratories with HFEA licenses to derive hESCs, posed a significant challenge to existing UK regulatory structures. All faced the same challenges in accrediting their facilities as GMP compliant and the interactions between the Bank and these laboratories areas central to our account. The unfolding narrative in both cases made associations between four regulatory bodies, exploring where their respective remits begin and end. The opposite ends of the diagram were described as being quite stable and uncontentious. This move was not because it had changed its position on the Bank's ability to work to their remit, but because it was felt that some form of external accreditation was required and it was probably the most suitable body.
But why had this ambiguity arisen? Two key definitional issues were identified at the meeting. The first was an issue for the HTA. As noted above, human material that has been 'processed' is no longer suitable for a HTA license. Most agree that deriving a hESC line crosses that boundary, and yet at the same time, any material that is to be placed into a human patient does require HTA licensing. At the time it was unclear whether hESC lines will ever be transplanted in this way, but it remained an explicit part of many projected imagined futures for the technology. In these moments of uncertainty, however, we can also discern the beginning of a practical closure of regulatory regress. It is within informal groups -like the Quality Forum meeting -where decisive action may begin. At the time the data were collected, the Quality Forum was orientating itself towards a set of specific aims.
Primarily they wanted to write their own Code of Practice for hESC GMP that would be ratified by both the HTA and the MHRA. Furthermore they proposed that the best way to proceed might be to self-audit among the group themselves because, at this stage, no external group had the expertise to perform the task effectively. Finally they suggested developing a 'Stem Cell History File' for each individual hESC line in the 14 UK. This document would be centrally stored at the UK Stem Cell Bank and would record details of all the technical work undertaken by the various laboratories using it.
While maintaining the file would be a significant investment of labour it was intended to minimise unnecessary bureaucratic work in a range of potential imagined futures.
These intentions from the Quality Forum are fundamental to the theoretical drive of this paper. They feed into our claim that concepts of the 'regulated' and 'regulator' are unhelpful in analysing these instances of regulatory development.
Instead, all in the room -the representatives of regulatory bodies and representatives of laboratories -are better described as regulatory actors iv . On one level they all share ambiguity as to the resolution of their shared dilemma. More fundamentally we see the members of the research laboratories -the Quality Forum -actively engaging in the production of regulatory practice. They intend to write the Code of Practice for hESC line GMP themselves -the document by which their own practices will be scrutinised. They then suggest that they are also the best equipped institutions to assure that each is complying with that Code through a regime of self-auditing. Relationships of regulator and regulated imply a power dynamic that brings with it implications of scrutiny and accountability. The regulator sets the stakes and the regulated must comply or be reprimanded. This type of relationship is simply absent from the data collected in this study. There are no actors unreservedly assuming the role of regulator. Scrutiny is not present and, as the above fieldwork extract demonstrates, bodies such as the HTA and MHRA are being held accountable to the Quality Forum for failing to provide them with acceptable guidance. While we do not want to argue that power is equally distributed between all regulatory actorsas the scientists are evidently seeking the approval of those working in regulatory bodies -we can say that the regulator and regulated power relationship is disrupted by this instance of regulatory regress, and indeed that the reestablishment of these relationships is in part dependent upon its closure.
To close this section we reiterate the central analytical points. The data demonstrate clear uncertainty as to the correct way to regulate, accredit and licence hESC GMP facilities. This uncertainty is primarily a function of two related issues.
The first is the role of competing imagined futures for hESC work. The eventual form any therapeutic benefits from hESC research may take is indeterminate. At the level of the regulatory text this manifests in definitional disputes around whether hESC lines are 'processed', and whether they will be considered 'Medicinal Products' or 'Raw Materials'. The second related issue compounds this further as the uncertainty sits at the juncture between the existing bodies of regulatory authority in the area.
This uncertainty introduces a circularity: laboratories cannot produce therapeutic products based around hESC lines because they lack suitable regulatory guidance for running a GMP laboratory space; and suitable regulatory guidance for running a GMP laboratory space cannot be produced because regulators do not know what form therapeutic products will take. This is regulatory regress.
Of course the regress presents only a logical circularity. It is escaped by broader social shaping; a form of life. The norms of GMP regulation are brought into being through a process of negotiation. In the case of the UK Stem Cell Bank we see a 16 spreading of autonomy between those who may become the regulators and those who may become regulated. In these early stages of closing regulatory regress however, we maintain, it is more suitable to speak of regulatory actors. As the Quality Forum engages with the textual and boundary disputes they approach practical closure of regulatory regress.
The case of Headlab
In "The foetal tissue we take we manipulate in vitro and associate into one cell and store for up to 7 days. Because of that we come under the Human Tissue Act, and so we have to have a GMP facility for taking that tissue and manipulating it. So for the first part of the trial [conducted in 2000/01] we did that in category 2 laboratory arrangements, we went through dry runs and we did transplants, we did a safety study and it was at that point we were hit by the Human Tissue Act and had to raise the money for the GMP laboratory. … One of the difficulties has been coming in at this completely new to the field with actually not a lot of assistance and funding to do it, and that is a big problem."
The transplant trials conducted in category 2 laboratories had to be immobilised immediately with the introduction of these new regulations since the laboratory could not control pressure gradients as stipulated by GMP. They were therefore required to begin constructing a purpose-built GMP clean room while also confronted by challenges documented in the UK Stem Cell Bank case, as described by Dr. Symonds:
"If I asked you who your regulators are, who would you say?" "I would say the Human Tissue Authority."
"Do the MHRA get involved at all?"
"That's a very good question...this is still an area of confusion, so when we first started doing this we were told we [were] under the regulation of the MHRA and we started going along that line, but after about a year, I think…a bit of it was being handed to the HTA, but it has been quite difficult, we haven't had clear messages and it's been quite difficult to find out who exactly is regulating you and what is expected."
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And Dr Long:
"I am not sure of the authority that we work under with GMP. I don't think it comes under the MHRA, but I am not sure. But we certainly come under the auspices of the Human Tissue Act…. The HTA is simply to do with the handling of human tissue; it is not what we then do with it. It is not the way that we process it. The way that we process it comes under GMP, but that is not to do with it being human tissue but because it is a product that is being manipulated and then given to human patients."
Both identify confusion over the structures of regulation for their laboratory and point to a lack of clarity in the guidance they receive. In an attempt to gain a fuller understanding of what is required of them, Headlab turned initially to existing regulatory texts. The national guide to GMP, commonly known as the Orange Guide, is a lengthy document that provides details to any changes or revisions of the EU's guide to GMP and directives on the medicinal products for human use. As described by Dr. Evans, this was their first point of reference: said you had to do dry-runs before you get to the point of delivering. We sat down as a group and decided that if we were going to do a good trial that was going to be as safe as possible for the patients that's what we needed to do, so to some extent the regulations are helpful in that they provide some sort of yardstick for that, because previously we had to make it all up ourselves. But to some extent… for a lot of what we do I don't think there won't be guidelines written down because it's academic work and you might be the only people doing it". This is another example of the scientist as regulatory actor. Headlab were writing their own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and soliciting support from a range of available sources; existing texts and social networks. They were producing regulatory practice in a form that, at this point in time, the regulatory bodies were unable to do.
We now turn to the importance of imagined futures. "I think the way we look at it is we're better off, we personally believe in the cell suspension method. If you ever do go to an alternative cell source it will have to be cell suspension. So regardless, the French are going to have to come to GMP eventually if they're going to work with stem cells or any other kind of cells."
and later:
"The GMP facility will put us in a hugely strong position for that trial given that the centres, for example, in Canada and Sweden don't have GMP facilities".
Headlab imagines a stem cell future for this type of work and the construction of a GMP facility will place them in a privileged position to lead future trials since becoming GMP accredited will be a form of social and cultural capital, engendering regulatory approval and minimizing potential harm. Accordingly, the GMP laboratory is both performative of the group's advancement while a central cause of its logistical problems. By arguing that any alternative cell source would have to be GMP accredited, the GMP regulation and the GMP facility scripts futures into present practices (Akrich 1992 "We will be discussing, well we're bringing tissue down from the hospital, we need a transport SOP. These are the scenarios that we have thought of, has anyone got any further ideas? And then someone will say, but hang on, how about this?
What if this happens?"
The group speculates on a range of potential scenarios for the GMP process and imagines what the appropriate response might be. These are written into SOPs, becoming constitutive in their regulation. We argue this self-regulation positions the group as regulatory actors; an in-house attempt to mitigate against risky, local futures and close the regress.
Headlab also attempt to close the regress by forming networks. The group employs an independent GMP consultant who they believe is closer to the regulators to work on interpreting the regulatory texts to begin building the suite, and after Glasner 2008i, 2011ii) . In keeping with this role the Bank decided that to prevent potential conflict of interest it would not conduct research itself. Headlab, in contrast, exists to research. It does not currently work with hESC lines, instead using foetal material, but with plans to do so in the future. These institutional differences are reflected in their differing experiences of regulatory regress.
The clearest difference between the two sites lies in their access and proximity to regulatory bodies. The UK Stem Cell Bank engaged with the staff of the HTA and MHRA more frequently than Headlab. On the other hand, Headlab's interaction was usually mediated via textual forms or intermediary networks, for example the Orange Guide, the HTA e-mail updates and the UK Stem Cell Bank's own networks of engagement. While the Bank has access to this material it also functions within the elite group of the Quality Forum and the associated access to expertise.
Despite these differences, regulatory regress is evident in both cases. The fundamental point, that regulations do not contain the rules of their own application, holds true. In the messy reality of regulatory development the available regulations are partial or contradictory. The uncertainty of imagined futures makes this doubly so.
Unforeseen futures and unforeseen regulatory actors add to the complexity and are often written into current regulatory practice. The uncertainty of regulatory regress, and the distribution of responsibility between those involved, suggests that the term 'regulatory actor' is more appropriate than regulator and regulated. Stability is only brought to the categories of regulator and regulated through the process of achieving regulatory closure.
Our empirical work is restricted to the UK, and we recognise the emergence of regulatory practice is culturally and nationally defined (cf. Zarzeczny et al 2009 , Hadow et al 2010 , Jasanoff 2005 . Therefore the extent to which our analysis is translatable to other countries in unclear. Indeed, even within the UK we do not assert that regulatory regress will be exhibited in all moments of biomedical regulatory innovation. However, as the regulation of biomedical research proliferates, and as biomedical innovation continues to expand, we do expect to find regulatory regress as an increasingly prominent concern in a number of settings. We expect to see more and more cases in which regulatory bodies and research laboratories need to find practical solutions that are adequate for all practical purposes. The proliferation of regulatory protocols clearly cannot determine their mundane interpretation. The worldly work of 27 implementing and interpreting the local application of regulatory protocols will be a continuing preoccupation for actors.
